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COLORADO'S UNDEMANDING NOTICE REQUIREMENT: PRO SE
DEFENDANTS AND FORENSIC TECHNICIAN TESTIMONY
Sarah M. Morris and Lauren L. Fontana

"The right of confrontation may not be dispensedwith so lightly."

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Call my accuser before my face," Sir Walter Raleigh demanded, before his triers
refused and sentenced him to death. Raleigh's command, which criminal defendants have
echoed since his 1603 trial, is of renewed relevance after a string of decisions by the
United States Supreme Court, as well as continuing controversies debunking the accuracy
and impartiality of forensic testing.
Since 2004's Crawford v. Washington,3 the United States Supreme Court has
transformed the scope of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. One facet of this
transformation has been the holding, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, that the Sixth
Amendment is violated by the admission of forensic reports without the testimony of their
authors. 5 In Melendez-Diaz, the Court determined that an accused's Sixth Amendment
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him extends to laboratory analysts. 6 This
express extension of the right of confrontation to forensic analysts is critical in an era

are two practicing civil rights attorneys at the Denver, Colorado law firm of KILLMER, LANE
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NEWMAN, LLP.

Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
2

541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

3id.
4

557 U.S. 305 (2009).

5

Id. at 310-11; see also Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2708 (2011) (determining that said
confrontation right is not satisfied by surrogate technician testimony). But see Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.
2221, 2228 (2012) (plurality opinion) (concluding that Confrontation Clause was not violated by expert witness
who testified as to DNA match of samples she had not herself tested).
6Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S.
at 347-48.
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when "[s]erious deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal
trials." 7
In the course of reaching its holding in Melendez-Diaz, the Court passed on the
basic validity of state "notice-and-demand" statutes, which, it said:
[i]n their simplest form . . . require the prosecution to provide notice to
the defendant of its intent to use an analyst's report as evidence at trial,
after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may
object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst's appearance
live at trial.8
The decision specifically cited an opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court, HinojosMendoza v. People,9 but neither discussed the merits of that opinion nor passed on the
constitutionality of the Colorado statute itself. 10 Hinojos-Mendoza, in turn, had upheld the
constitutionality of Colorado's notice-and-demand statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-309(5),
as to defendants represented by counsel, but expressly left open the constitutionality of the
statute as applied to pro se defendants.

7

Id. at 319; see, e.g., id. at 318-19 (documenting how "[florensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk
of manipulation"); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2007) (Michael, J., dissenting) ("In
one notorious case, a forensic serologist at the West Virginia Department of Public Safety falsified hundreds of
forensic tests between 1979 and 1989."); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2004)
(documenting misconduct of one Oklahoma forensic chemist across at least four criminal cases and two
professional sanctions); Paul C. Giannelli, Admissibility ofLab Reports: The Right ofConfrontationPost-

Crawford, 19 CRIM. JUST. 26, 30 (2004) ("Anyone who would question the value of cross-examination in this
context need only look at recent newspaper headlines."); Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59
VAND. L. REV. 475, 491-500 (2006) (detailing the "[m]yth of [r]eliability" surrounding forensic evidence and
describing scandals at Baltimore and Phoenix crime laboratories); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the
Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 791, 843 n.86 (2007) (citing problems
with DWI testing and with FBI laboratory results); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE FBI
DNA LABORATORY: A REVIEW OF PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE VULNERABILITIES i-iii (2004) (reviewing protocol

and practice vulnerabilities following discovery of misconduct by DNA analyst who, from 1988-2002,
consistently failed to complete control tests in a majority of her cases and falsified laboratory documentation to
cover it up); Jack Healy, ColoradoState Lab Accused ofMishandlingEvidence, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2013

(reporting how investigation revealed "problems including bias against defendants, inadequate training and flaws
in the way evidence is stored at the lab");Joseph Goldstein & Nina Bernstein, Ex-TechnicianDenies Faulty DNA
Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2013, at Al5 (discussing New York City laboratory technician who missed and
commingled biological evidence in rape cases); Nick Bunkley, DetroitPolice Lab Is ClosedAfter Audit Finds

Serious Errorsin Many Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A17 (reporting the closure of Detroit's crime
laboratory after an "audit said sloppy work had probably resulted in wrongful convictions"); Denise Lavoie, Exstate ChemistAnnie Dookhan PleadsNot Guilty; Faces 6 Charges of Obstruction,BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3 1,

2013, at B2, B22 (documenting criminal charges against former state chemist accused of faking test results, who
allegedly would add cocaine to samples and report results as positive without testing); Solomon Moore, Science
Found Wanting in Nation's Crime Labs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at Al (describing National Academy of
Sciences report containing "sweeping critique of many forensic methods that the police and prosecutors rely on,
including fingerprinting, firearms identification and analysis of bite marks, blood spatter, hair and handwriting,"
which was later cited in Melendez-Diaz); Campbell Robertson, Questions Left for Mississippi Over Doctor's

Autopsies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/us/questions-for-mississippi-doctorafter-thousands-of-autopsies.html?pagewanted=2 (describing forensic pathologist who, between the late 1980s
and late 2000s, misrepresented his qualifications and testified as to theories well beyond those standard in the
field). In short, "[i]t is not difficult to find instances in which laboratory procedures have been abused." Williams,
132 S. Ct. at 2250 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326 (citation omitted).
9

169 P. 3d 662, 670 (Colo. 2007).

'o Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 327 (citing Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 670 (Colo. 2007)).

" Hinojos-Mendoza, 169 P.3d at 670 n.7. ("We offer no opinion on whether the analysis would be altered if
Hinojos-Mendoza had been a pro se defendant.").
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This Article tackles the question that Hinojos-Mendoza left open. Section II
reviews the United States Supreme Court's line of cases, beginning with the watershed
case of Crawfordv. Washington, redefining the reach of the Confrontation Clause to bar
the admission of testimonial statements of an unavailable witness whom the defendant did
not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Section III details the Colorado Supreme
Court's three pronouncements on the constitutionality of Colorado's notice-and-demand
statute, the last of which came after-but, this Article argues, does not follow-MelendezDiaz. Section IV reviews, in the words of dissenting Colorado Supreme Court Justice
Martinez, "the U.S. Supreme Court's steadfast refusal to presume waiver [of a
fundamental constitutional right] from inaction."12 Section V adds a review of other state
court decisions on the constitutionality or lack thereof of notice-and-demand statutes as
enacted across the country. Section VI concludes that the way by which the statute waives
an accused's constitutional right to confrontation renders the statute unconstitutional as
applied to pro se defendants. In reaching that conclusion, this Article bears in mind the
United States Supreme Court's admonition that "[t]he Sixth Amendment stands as a
constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not
still be done." 1 3

II.

"[W]HAT THE SIXTH AMENDMENT PRESCRIBES"'4 : CRAWFORD V.
WASHINGTON AND ITS PROGENY

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which extends to federal and state prosecutions,1 5 guarantees a criminal
defendant "the right . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."16 Until recently,
courts held that the admission of an unavailable witness's testimony did not offend the
Confrontation Clause if the testimony bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability."' In a recent
line of cases beginning with the watershed case of Crawfordv. Washington, however, the
United States Supreme Court rejected this method of analysis and left in its place a
holding that the Confrontation Clause is violated by the admission of testimonial
statements of an unavailable witness whom the defendant did not have a prior opportunity
to cross-examine.19 This Section details Crawford and its relevant progeny, culminating in
the most recent cases that apply Crawford to the testimony of laboratory technicians and
20
analysts.
12

Cropper v. People, 251 P.3d 434, 442 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (Martinez, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

" Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938), overruled in parton other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
14 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
"Mendozav. People, 169 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2007) (en banc) (citing Pointerv. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406
(1965)).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The analogous provision of the Colorado Constitution
guarantees a criminal
defendant "the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16.
17 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
" See id. at 60-62 (characterizing the Roberts reliability test as "amorphous" and a "malleable standard [that]
often fails to protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations"). The Court further described reliability as "a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee." Id. at 61. According to the Court, the Roberts test, rather than
ensuring that guarantee was realized, operated as "a surrogate means of assessing reliability." Id. at 62.
19

Id. at 68.

Two cases in the Crawford line, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011) (holding that murder
victim's statements to police identifying defendant after he was shot but before he died were not testimonial
because they were intended to help police resolve an ongoing emergency, and Crawford did not bar their
admission); and Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 355-56, 377 (2008) (holding that a murdervictim's statements
to police about the defendant three weeks before she was murdered were not admissible pursuant to Crawford
20
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Crawford v. Washington: Redefining the Confrontation Clause's
Protection

In the watershed case of Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme
Court announced a new test governing the scope of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to
the accused of the right be confronted with the witnesses against him.21 Tracing the
confrontation right to Roman times, the Court drew two inferences about the meaning of
the Sixth Amendment.22 First, the Court concluded that "the principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed" was the "use of ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused."23 Accordingly, the Court determined that the Framers directed the
,24
Confrontation Clause at "witnesses" who "bear testimony." The Court in turn defined
"testimony" as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact."25 Though it ultimately left for another day the pronouncement of a
comprehensive definition, Crawford did enumerate examples of what it termed the "core
class of 'testimonial' statements":
ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;
extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions; statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial. 26
The second inference that the Crawford Court drew was that the Framers, via the Sixth
Amendment, "conditioned admissibility of an absent witness's examination on
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine."27 In its analysis, the Court
forcefully described the Confrontation Clause as "a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee,"28 not intended to be left to "the vagaries of the rules of evidence."29 The Court
because the defendant could not confront his accuser, despite the fact that his actions caused her to be
unavailable), are excepted, as they do not bear on this Article.
Crawford, and for that matter Davis after it, were written by Justice Scalia. Some trace the origins of the
opinion to Justice Scalia's dissent in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), in which he rejected the majority's
holding that a Maryland statute did not violate the Confrontation Clause by permitting a child abuse victim to
testify via one-way closed-circuit television rather than face-to-face in a courtroom against the accused. Justice
Scalia characterized the majority opinion as the "subordination of explicit constitutional text to currently favored
public policy." Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, the holding contravened the
Constitution because "[t]he purpose of enshrining [the Confrontation Clause's] protection in the Constitution was
to assure that none of the many policy interests from time to time pursued by statutory law could overcome a
defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court." Id. Justice Scalia would have required face-to-face
confrontation of the child witness because, he stated, "For good or bad, the Sixth Amendment requires
confrontation, and we are not at liberty to ignore it." Id. at 870.
22 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 53-54.
21

23 Id. at 50; accord id. at 53 ("[E]ven if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay,
that is its primary object. . . .").

24 See id. at 51 (citing 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828))
(defining

"witnesses" as "those who 'bear testimony"') (first internal quotation omitted).
25 Id. at 51 (citing 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828))
(internal

quotations omitted).
26 Id. at 51-52, 68 (citations omitted) (internal quotations
omitted).
27 Id. at
54.
28

Id. at 61.

29

Id.

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol3/iss1/4

4

Morris and Fontana: Colorado's Undemanding Notice Requirement: Pro Se Defendants and
COLORADO'S UNDEMANDING NOTICE REQUIREMENT

2013]

115

summarized its holding as follows: "Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination." 3 0
B.

Davis v. Washington: Further Defining "Testimonial"

The day to which Crawford left a more comprehensive definition of
,31
3
"testimonial"
soon came. In Davis v. Washington,32 the Supreme Court clarified
Crawford's definition of "testimonial" within the context of police interrogations.3 3 While
still refusing "to produce an exhaustive classification," the Court held:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.3 4
The key difference, according to the Davis Court, is between describing "what is
happening" and "what happened." 3 5 Given that Davis addressed only statements in
response to police interrogations (and then, not even "exhaustive[1y]"36), questions
remained concerning the application of "testimonial" to statements made in other contexts.
C.

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Forensic Technician Affidavits Are
Testimonial

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court took up
one variant of those remaining questions: whether affidavits from forensic analysts are
testimonial statements triggering the protection of the Confrontation Clause.3 7 The
Massachusetts state court below had admitted into evidence sworn affidavits called
"'certificates of analysis" that showed the results of forensic analysis performed on the
substances seized from the criminal defendant to be cocaine. 38 The defendant had objected
on Confrontation Clause grounds, but the court below admitted the certificates pursuant to
a state statute "as 'prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of

30
'

32

Id. at 68.

See id. ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial."').
547 U.S. 813 (2006).

* Id. at 817, 822. Davis also determined the companion case ofHammonv. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 819-21. As a
primary matter, the Davis Court clarified, in case Crawfordhad left any doubt, that Crawfordapplies only to
testimonial statements. Id. at 824. Technically, Crawford had not decided this question, nor had it
comprehensively defined testimonial evidence. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
34 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. Importantly, the Court noted that its holding did not imply "that statements made in the
absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial." Id. at 822 n.1. The Court was careful to explain that
its decision did not "consider whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement
personnel are 'testimonial."' Id. at 823 n.2.
" Id. at 830. The Court did note the possibility that a conversation might "evolve into testimonial statements." Id.
at 828 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 Id. at
822.
1

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307 (2009).

3

Id. at 308 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the narcotic . . . analyzed."' 3 9 The state courts below held that the certificates were not
testimonial hearsay subject to the protections of the Confrontation Clause.40
The United States Supreme Court quickly and decisively reversed.4 1 The Court
had no trouble viewing the documents at issue "quite plainly [as] affidavits" and therefore
"within the 'core class of testimonial statements"' described in Crawford."42 Accordingly,
[a]bsent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to 'be confronted
with' the analysts at trial." 4 3 In reaching its holding, the Court rejected two rationales that
other courts had employed to admit forensic affidavits as evidence. First, the Court
rejected the notion that the Compulsory Process Clause, and a defendant's ability to obtain
"witnesses 'in his favor"' under it, could serve as an adequate substitute for an accused's
confrontation right. Second, the Court rejected the proposition that forensic analysis
affidavits are admissible as business records.46 Instead, the Court determined: "there [may
be] other ways-and in some cases better ways-to challenge or verify the results of a
forensic test. But the Constitution guarantees one way: confrontation. We do not have
license to suspend the Confrontation Clause when a preferable trial strategy is
available. " "The Confrontation Clause-like those other constitutional provisions-is
binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience."
The Court recognized that its opinion had practical ramifications, but was
convinced that those consequences would not be dire. 4 9 The Court observed, "Many States
have already adopted the constitutional rule we announce today, while many others permit
the defendant to assert (or forfeit by silence) his Confrontation Clause right after receiving
,5
notice of the prosecution's intent to use a forensic analyst's report," 0 and explicated as
follows:
In their simplest form, notice-and-demand statutes require the
prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an
analyst's report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant is given a
period of time in which he may object to the admission of the evidence
absent the analyst's appearance live at trial. Contrary to the dissent's
perception, these statutes shift no burden whatever. The defendant
always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection;
notice-and-demand statutes simply govern the time within which he
must do so. States are free to adopt procedural rules governing
objections. It is common to require a defendant to exercise his rights
under the Compulsory Process Clause in advance of trial, announcing
his intent to present certain witnesses. There is no conceivable reason
39

Id. at 309 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13) (omission in original).

40

Id.

41

Id. at 329.
Id. at 310; see also id. at 329 ("This case involves little more than the application of our holding in Crawfordv.

42

Washington").
43 Id. at 311 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54) (emphasis in original).
44 Id. at 326-29.
45
46

Id. at 3 13-14, 324-25 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend VI).
Id. at 321-24.

47 Id. at 318 (footnote omitted).
48 Id. at 325.

49 Id. (explaining that "the sky will not fall after today's decision").

'0 Id. at 325-26 (footnote omitted).
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why he cannot similarly be compelled to exercise his Confrontation
Clause rights before trial. See Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P. 3d
662, 670 (Colo. 2007) (discussing and approving Colorado's noticeand-demandprovision)
The Court expressly disavowed the notion that its opinion constitutionalized anything
,52
more than the "simplest form [of] notice-and-demand statutes." The majority opinion
offered no discussion of the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in Hinojos-Mendozaother
than the citation offered above.
Justice Kennedy's dissent, however, would have drawn a distinction "between
laboratory analysts who perform scientific tests and other, more conventional
,53
witnesses."
The former, Justice Kennedy believed, are not 'witnesses against" an
accused within the original meaning of those words. 4 Rather, the Framers intended the
Confrontation Clause to apply only to the latter, which he defined as witnesses with some
personal knowledge of the defendant's guilt.5 5 Throughout, Justice Kennedy expressed
grave concerns about the practical implications of the Court's holding,56 and suggested
that the holding failed to account for "the increasing reliability of scientific testing." 5 7 His
opinion contains little doubt that the holding granted criminal defendants and the defense
bar a tactical advantage that will certainly be deployed.
Importantly, Justice Kennedy rebutted the majority's interpretation of notice-anddemand statutes.59 His opinion recognized that such statutes, contrary to the majority's
reasoning, "do impose requirements on the defendant," which operate to "reduce[] the
confrontation right."60 He named Colorado, and Hinojos-Mendoza specifically, among this
group.61 This Article will go on to argue, using the Hinojos-Mendoza opinion itself, that
Justice Kennedy's interpretation was the better one.
D.

Bullcoming v. New Mexico: Rejecting Surrogate Technician
Testimony

The Court next visited the topic of confrontation of forensic technician witnesses
62
in Bullcoming v. New Mexico. There, the prosecution introduced testimonial evidence,
" Id. at 325-27 (some internal citations omitted, emphasis added).
52 Id. at 327 n.12 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("We
have no occasion today to pass
on the constitutionality of every variety of statute commonly given the notice-and-demand label. It suffices to
say that what we have referred to as the 'simplest form [of] notice-and-demand statutes,' is constitutional."
(citation omitted)); accordAndrew W. Eichner, Note, The FailuresofMelendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and the
Unstable Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 437, 450-51 (2011) (observing that after Melendez-Diaz,

certain variations of notice-and-demand statute may yet be deemed unconstitutional).
" Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
54
Id. at 343.
Id. at 330-31.
Id. at 331-43.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 352-55.
59

Id. at 355-56.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 3 56-57 (citing, inter alia, Hinojos-Mendozav. People, 169 P. 3d 662, 668-71 (Colo. 2007); COLO. REV.

STAT. ANN.

§

16-3-309)).

62

131 S. Ct. 2705, 2707 (2011). One opinion interceded between Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, butthe Court
did not use it to offer any substantive guidance on its holding inMelendez-Diaz. Four days after the publication
of its opinion inMelendez-Diaz, the Court granted certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia. 557 U.S. 933 (2009). Several
months later, the Court disposed of the case, per curiam, by vacating the judgment of the Virginia high court and
remanding the case "for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion in Melendez-Diaz v.
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namely, a forensic laboratory report certifying that the DWI defendant's blood alcohol
concentration level was above the threshold for aggravated DWI, but it did so via the
63
testimony of an analyst who neither signed the report nor observed the test reported.
Citing Crawford and its line, including Davis's pronouncement that the "Confrontation
Clause may not be 'evaded by having a note-taking police [officer] recite the . .
testimony of the declarant,"'64 the Court determined that the right of confrontation is not
,65
satisfied by such so-called "surrogate testimony."
The Court once again rejected the
notion that laboratory reports are non-testimonial, and firmly reiterated its holding in
66
Melendez-Diaz that they are. In so doing, the Court disavowed any reliance on the
supposed reliability of such reports: "the comparative reliability of an analyst's testimonial
report drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar.
This Court settled in Crawfordthat the 'obviou[s] reliab[ility]' of a testimonial statement
does not dispense with the Confrontation Clause." 6 7
Justice Ginsburg, in a portion of her opinion joined only by Justice Scalia, echoed
Melendez-Diaz and rejected any notion that its holding imposed an undue burden on
68
69
According to her, any such burden was capable of being reduced.
prosecution.
70
Retesting of the sample at issue by the analyst to be called was always an option.
Similarly, the Court reiterated that states may enact notice-and-demand statutes that
"specifically preserv[e]" an accused's confrontation right.
Justice Kennedy again dissented, echoing his Melendez-Diaz dissent and also
tracing the problems with the majority opinion to Crawford and the cases extending it.72
His opinion detailed his view that, via Crawford and later cases, the "Court has taken the
Clause far beyond its most important application, which is to forbid sworn, ex parte, outof-court statements by unconfronted and available witnesses who observed the crime and
do not appear at trial. 73 Making passing reference to notice-and-demand statutes, Justice
Kennedy discarded the majority's reliance on such laws as an appropriate "palliative" for
the disruption to be wrought by its holding.

Massachusetts."Briscoe, 559 U.S. at 32. The holding of the Virginia court on remand, in Cypress v.
Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 206 (Va. 2010), is addressed in Section 0., infra.
6 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709.
64 Id. at 2715 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (alteration in
original) (omission in original)
(deletion of emphasis in original)).
61 Id. at 2710. A majority of the Courtjoined in all but one part of the decision written by Justice Ginsburg.
Justice Sotomayor joined in all but Part IV of that decision, id. at 2709, and also issued her own concurrence in
part, id. at 2719-23.
66 Id. at 2717 (majority
opinion).
67 Id. at 2715 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 61 (2004)).
6

Id. at 2717.
Id. at 2718.
70 Id. ("New Mexico could have avoided any Confrontation Clause problem by asking
Razatos to retest the
sample, and then testify to the results of his retest rather than to the results of a test he did not conduct or
observe."); Jesse J. Norris, Who Can Testify about Lab Results after Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming?: Surrogate

69

Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375, 385 (2011) ("[T]he Court's opinion did not

rule on the constitutionality of surrogate testimony when the surrogate had played some role in or observed the
test, or had offered an independent analysis of either an analyst's report that was not admitted into evidence, or
machine-generated 'raw data' that was admitted into evidence.").
' Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2718.
72 Id. at 2723-28 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
7 Id. at 2727 (emphasis in original).
74

Id. at 2728.
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Williams v. Illinois: "Nothing Comparable Happened Here" 75

If Bullcoming was a sign that the Crawford majority was fracturing, the next case
to reach the Supreme Court's docket confirmed it.76 In Williams v. Illinois, the Court took
up the issue of whether "Crawford bar[s] an expert from expressing an opinion based on
facts about a case that have been made known to the expert but about which the expert is
not competent to testify."7 At Williams' bench trial, the prosecution called an expert
witness who testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory matched a
profile produced by the state laboratory using Williams' blood sample.7 " The expert
testified that the outside laboratory was accredited and provided the police with a DNA
profile, and explained that according to shipping manifests admitted as business records,
swabs taken from the victim were provided to and received back from the outside lab.7 9
The expert did not testify as to the accuracy of the profile of the outside lab, nor did he
testify as to how the outside lab handled or tested the sample. 0 The outside laboratory
report was neither admitted into evidence, nor identified as the source of the expert's
opinion; the expert testified that her testimony relied exclusively on the outside report. 1
The problem, as Justice Thomas explained in his concurrence, was that the expert's
testimony "went well beyond what was necessary to explain why she performed the
[match]."82
Justice Alito delivered a plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Breyer joined. The opinion issued "two independent reasons . . [to]
conclude that there was no Confrontation Clause violation in this case." 8 3 First, the
plurality held that no Confrontation Clause violation was effected by the expert's
testimony because his testimony was not considered for the truth of the matter asserted. 4
That is, "the report was not to be considered for its truth but only for the 'distinctive and
limited purpose' of seeing whether it matched something else."85 This portion of the
7

Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2240 (2012).

This fracturing was evident in the fact that Williams produced a plurality opinion, as explained in this Section.
Justice Alito's opinion went so far as to suggest, "Experience might yet show that the holdings in those cases
should be reconsidered for the reasons, among others, expressed in the dissents the decisions produced." Id. at
2242 n.13.
77 Id. at 2227. Justice Sotomayor had raised this question in her concurrence in Bullcoming, noting that the
Court's opinion did not address this issue and therefore it remained to be confronted. See id. at 2233 (citing
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part)).
78 Id. at 2227. This expert was one of three expert forensic
witnesses. Id. at 2229.
79 Id. at 2227.
76

go Id.

" Id. at 2230; see also id. at 2229-31, 2235-36. In recounting the laboratory technician's testimony, the plurality
(and the dissent) focused on the following line of questioning: "Q Was there a computer match generated of the
male DNA profile found in semen from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] to a male DNA profile that had been
identified as having originated from Sandy Williams?" "A Yes, there was." Id. at 2236 (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
82

Id. at 2258 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring); accordid. at 2270 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

Id. at 2244 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2228. According to the plurality, such testimony "fall[s] outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause."
Id. In reaching this conclusion, the opinion relied in part on the long-standing rule that an expert witness may
opine as to facts even if he lacks first-hand knowledge of them. Id. at 2233; see also id. at 2228 ("[A]n expert
may express an opinion that is based on facts that the expert assumes, but does not know, to be true.").
84

Id. at 2240 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 417 (1985)). In this portion of the decision, the plurality
in several instances hinted that is holding was factually dependent on the fact that the trier-of-fact at issue was a
judge in a bench trial. See, e.g., id. at 2236-37, 2241 n. 11. Ultimately, however, the plurality disavowed the
"suggest[ion] that the Confrontation Clause applies differently depending on the identity of the factfinder."Id. at
2237 n.4; cf id. at 2271 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("But the presence of ajudge does not transform the
constitutional question.").
8
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decision was in harmony with Crawford,8 as well as with Bullcoming and MelendezDiaz," according to the plurality opinion. Second, the plurality concluded that, even if the
report were considered for the truth of the matter asserted, there was no confrontation
violation." The plurality distinguished the report at issue in Williams as one that "plainly
was not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual . . . no[r] to
accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial."8 The plurality stated that this
holding, too, comported with Crawford and subsequent cases. 90 It distinguished the report
at issue from the reports in prior cases by noting that "[i]n all but one of the post-Crawford
cases in which a Confrontation Clause violation has been found," the statement at issue
had "the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual." 91 It went on to describe
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming as holding the forensic reports at issue to be testimonial,
but "not hold[ing] that all forensic reports fall into the same category."9 2
Justice Breyer issued a concurrence, in which he stated that he would adhere to
the dissenting views in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, but joined in the plurality.9 3
Justice Breyer would have gone farther than the majority and answered the broader
question of, "How does the Confrontation Clause apply to the panoply of crime laboratory
reports and underlying technical statements written by (or otherwise made by) laboratory
technicians?"94 His concurrence adhered to the dissents in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming
to determine that the report at issue was not "testimonial" and therefore no confrontation
was required. 9 5 In reaching this decision, he agreed with the plurality's determination that
the report at issue was not prepared for the purpose of accusing a targeted individual. 96
Justice Breyer would have created a presumption that "reports such as the DNA report
before us presumptively to lie outside the perimeter of the Clause as established by the
Court's precedents."
That presumption could be rebutted by "good reason to doubt the
laboratory's competence or the validity of its accreditation" or "the existence of a motive
to falsify." 98

Id. at 2235 (majority opinion) ("Crawford ... took pains to reaffirm the proposition that the Confrontation
Clause 'does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted."' (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59-60 n.9 (2004)).
87 Id. at 2240. The plurality determined that "[i]n
those cases, the forensic reports were introduced into evidence,
and there is no question that this was done for the purpose of proving the truth of what they asserted." Id.
16

" Id. at 2242.
89 Id. at 2243. In this vein, the plurality characterized the report as "not inherently inculpatory" and noted that the
technicians who prepare such reports have "no idea what the consequences of their work will be ... whether it
will turn out to be incriminating or exonerating-or both." Id. at 2228, 2244.

90 Id. at 2232, 2240.
9' Id. at 2242 (footnote omitted).
92

Id. at 2243.

93 Id. at 2245 (Breyer, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 2244.
95 Id. at 2248.

Id. at 2250-51; id. at 2248-49 (describing the statements at issue as "made by an accredited laboratory
employee operating at a remove from the investigation in the ordinary course of professional work" who was
"operat[ing] behind a veil of ignorance that likely prevented them from knowing the identity of the defendant in
this case"); id. at 2251 (citation omitted) ("[H]ere the DNA report sought, not to accuse petitioner, but instead to
generate objectively a profile of a then-unknown suspect's DNA from the semen he left in committing the
crime."). Despite this, the California Supreme Court has held that a laboratory analyst's report stating the
defendant's blood-alcohol content was not testimonial because "the critical portions of that report were not made
with the requisite degree of formality or solemnity to be considered testimonial." People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469,
477 (Cal. 2012).
97 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring).
96

98

Id. at 2252.
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Yet "[flive Justices specifically reject[ed] every aspect of [the plurality's]
reasoning and every paragraph of its explication."99 Justice Thomas concurred with the
conclusion that the expert testimony did not violate the defendant's confrontation right,
but agreed with the dissent that the plurality's opinion was flawed. 100 Justice Kagan,
joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, dissented. 101 Her dissent determined
that the report was identical to those in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming102 and that the
expert's testimony at issue was "functionally identical" to that unconstitutionally proffered
in Bullcoming.103 When the expert introduced the substance of the report into evidence,
then, the author of "that report 'became a witness' whom Williams 'had the right to
10
confront."'o
"The plurality's primary argument to the contrary tries to exploit a limit to
the Confrontation Clause recognized in Crawford'1 0 5 and created for the prosecution "a
ready method to bypass the Constitution."106 The dissent rejected the "targeted individual"
test supported by the plurality, finding that it could not be supported by Crawford and its
progeny. 1 0 7 Under the dissent's reading of the Court's precedents, "[w] e have held that the
Confrontation Clause requires something more." 108
After Williams, the fate of the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawfordis
unclear, especially as to forensic witnesses. As Justice Kagan acutely summarized in her
dissent,
What comes out of four Justices' desire to limit Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming in whatever way possible, combined with one Justice's onejustice view of those holdings, is-to be frank-who knows what.
Those decisions apparently no longer mean all that they say. Yet no one
can tell in what way or to what extent they are altered because no
proposed limitation commands the support of a majority. 1 0 9

III.

COLORADO'S NOTICE-AND-DEMAND STATUTE

In the meantime, however, the fate of technician testimony is settled for the time
being in Colorado, at least as to defendants represented by counsel. Colorado has a noticeand-demand statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-309(5), and its Supreme Court has passed
judgment on it.1 10 In its current form, that statute provides:

99 Id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., concurring).

Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas concluded that the "report [wa]s not a statement by a
'witnes[s]' within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 2260 (alterations in original).
100

101 Id. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 2266. Accordingly, Justice Kagan determined that the report was
testimonial. Id. at 2272-75.
103 Id. at 2267, 2270. Justice Kagan also accurately identified "the typical problem with laboratory analyses--and
the typical focus of cross-examination" as "careless or incompetent work, rather than with personal vendettas. Id.
at 2274.
104 Id. at 2268 (quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2011)).

105 Id. at 2268. Like Justice Thomas, Justice Kagan argued that the "admission of the out-of-court statement in
this context has no purpose separate from its truth." Id. at 2269; see also id. at 2258 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 2270 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 2274 ("None of our cases has ever suggested that, in addition, the statement
must be meant to accuse a
previously identified individual.").
108

Id. at 2270.

109

Id. at 2277.

10

See Hinojos-Mendozav. People, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2003).
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Any report or copy thereof or the findings of the criminalistics
laboratory shall be received in evidence in any court, preliminary
hearing, or grand jury proceeding in the same manner and with the same
force and effect as if the employee or technician of the criminalistics
laboratory who accomplished the requested analysis, comparison, or
identification had testified in person. Any party may request that such
employee or technician testify in person at a criminal trial on behalf of
the state before a jury or to the court, by notifying the witness and other
party at least fourteen days before the date of such criminal trial."'
This Section details the Colorado Supreme Court decisions analyzing the statute both
before and after Crawford.
A.

People v. Mojica-Simental: The (Short-Lived) Actual Notice
Requirement

Even before Crawford, the Colorado Supreme Court took up the constitutionality
112
of Colorado's notice-and-demand statute in the 2003 case of People v. Mojica-Simental.
Characterizing the statute as a mere precondition on an accused's exercise of his
constitutional right, which can be met by "minimal effort" on his part, the Court
determined that Colorado's notice-and-demand statute is facially constitutional.113 Under
the Court's conceptualization, the notice-and-demand statute "does not impermissibly
shift the burden of proof to the defendant." 1 The Court determined that the defendant's
as-applied challenge was not yet ripe for review, but was careful to recognize that "there
may be circumstances where it is, in fact, an unreasonable burden and effectively abridges
a defendant's right to confrontation."
The Court enumerated at least one such
circumstance: "[i]f a defendant does not have actual notice of the requirements of the
statute, or mistakenly fails to notify the prosecution to have the technician present to
,116
testify."
In that circumstance, the Court cautioned, 'there is a significant possibility that
a defendant's failure to act may not constitute a voluntary waiver of his fundamental right
to confrontation," as required by the Constitution.1 17
The Court concluded by enumerating "some factors" a trial court might consider
before admitting a laboratory report without its author's testimony:
whether an attorney or a pro se litigant actually knew that he was
required to notify the opposing party of his desire to have the witness
present; the reasons why notice was late or was not given at all; the
difficulty of acquiring the presence of the witness; the significance to
the case of the report and of the testimony that would be elicited from
the technician; and any other pertinent circumstances.
Underscoring the importance of actual notice, the Court stated that the statute would be
"best utilized" in practice if both the prosecution and defense "discuss the matter, at some
pre-trial opportunity, to ensure that all parties are in agreement as to whether the witness

§ 16-3-309(5) (2012).
73 P.3d 15, 17 (Colo. 2003).

. Colo. Rev. Stat.
112
113

Id. at 17-18.

114

Id. at 19.

. Id. at 20-21.
116

Id.

117 Id.

...
Id. at 21.
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will be present." 119 Unfortunately for defendants, despite the Supreme Court's subsequent
pronouncements in Crawford, the actual notice requirement that Mojica-Simental
appeared to impose was soon abandoned by the Colorado Supreme Court.
B.

Hinojos-Mendoza v. People: "No Constitutional Infirmity in Section
16-3-309(5)",120

In Hinojos-Mendoza, the Colorado Supreme Court revisited the constitutionality
of Colorado's notice-and-demand statute in light of Crawford.121 First, the Court
determined that laboratory reports are testimonial statements subject to Crawford.122 This
decision predated-but accords with-the United States Supreme Court's later opinions in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. The Court went on to consider both facial and as-applied
challenges to Section 16-3-309(5).123
The Court began its analysis by noting that the right to confrontation is
waivablel24 and defining waiver "as the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right."'125 Against this backdrop, the Court conceptualized the statute as nothing
more than a statutory procedural requirement and upheld its facial constitutionality:
The procedure provided in section 16-3-309(5) for ensuring the presence
of the lab technician at trial does not deny a defendant the opportunity to
cross-examine the technician, but simply requires that the defendant
decide prior to trial whether he will conduct a cross-examination. The
statute provides the opportunity for confrontation - only the timing of
the defendant's decision is changed. 1 2 6
The Court went on to uphold the constitutionality of the statute as applied to
Hinojos-Mendoza.127 Its reasoning on this prong, however, was far more detailed-and
convoluted. At trial, the prosecution introduced the lab report without the testimony of its
author. 12 Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds and, when questioned by the trial
court, explained that he had not requested the report's author pursuant to Section 16-3309(5) because he was unaware of the statute.129 The trial court overruled the objection
and admitted the report into evidence.130 This ruling was not without consequence. A
critical fact in determining Hinojos-Mendoza's potential punishment was the net weight of
the drugs; because the report was ambiguous on this point, and because the author of the

119

Id.

Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 669 (Colo. 2007).
Id. at 664. The Court employed the same reasoning and reached the same result in a case announced the same
day, Coleman v. People, 169 P.3d 659 (Colo. 2007), reh g denied, No. 06SC155, 2007 Colo. LEXIS 1037 (Colo.
Nov. 5, 2007).
122 Id. at 666. The dissenting opinion agreed with this portion
of the Court's holding. Id. at 671 (Martinez, J.,
dissenting).
120
121

123

Id. at 667-78.

Id. at 668 (citing Brookhartv. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1154 (10th
Cir. 1999)).
125 Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 733 (1993)).
124

126

Id. at 668-69.

127

Id. at 670.

128

Id. at 664.

129

id

130 Id. at 664-65.
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report was not required to testify to resolve the ambiguity, Hinojos-Mendoza faced a
longer potential maximum sentence.131
First, the Court abandoned Mojica-Simental as foreshadowing a different
outcome for Hinojos-Mendoza. It stated, "The dicta in Mojica-Simentalwas based on the
faulty premise that the right to confrontation can only be waived if the defendant
personally makes a voluntary, knowing, and intentional waiver."132 Instead, the Court
determined, a defendant's right to confrontation may be waived by defense counsel,133 and
it may be waived by defense counsel's failure to comply with the procedural demand of
Section 16-3-309(5).134 On the latter point, the Court issued a conclusive presumption that
"'where a defendant such as Hinojos-Mendoza is represented by counsel, the failure to
comply with the statutory prerequisites of section 16-3-309(5) waives the defendant's right
to confront the witness just as the decision to forgo cross-examination at trial would waive
that right."135 This presumption arose from a separate, underlying presumption in
Colorado law, that of defense counsel having knowledge of all applicable rules of
procedure.136 The Court's reasoning makes both presumptions irrebuttable, because it
applied the presumptions in the face of defense counsel's admission that he was unaware
of the statute and had not intended to waive confrontation. 137
The Court explicitly left open the question of the constitutionality of Section 163-309(5) as applied to pro se defendants. 13 This opening, however, did Hinojos-Mendoza
no good. For him, the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion was the end of the road. That
court denied his petition for rehearing.139 And four days after the United States Supreme
Court announced its decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, and the same day it
remanded Briscoe v. Virginia, that Court denied Hinojos-Mendoza's petition for
certiorari.140
Two justices of the Colorado Supreme Court would have found in favor of
Hinojos-Mendoza's confrontation right.
Having discerned in the majority opinion no
" Id. at 674 (Martinez, J., dissenting). Crucially, the report "listed the weight of the 'tan tape wrapped block' as
1004.5 grams, but omitted whether the weight included the tape and packaging or was just the net weight of the
drugs.... The maximum sentence for a class three felony possession with intent to distribute less than one
thousand grams is sixteen years in prison. The maximum sentence for one thousand grams or more is twenty-four
years in prison." Id. (footnote omitted). Because of one ambiguous sentence in a report whose author he was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine, Hinojos-Mendoza faced eight more years in prison.
132 Id. at 669 (citing People v. Mojica-Simental, 73 P.3d
15, 20 (Colo. 2003)).
. Id. ("The right to confrontation falls into the class of rights that defense counsel can waive through strategic
decisions.").
134 Id. at 670.
1

Id.

Id. (citing Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237, 1244 (Colo. 1992)). The Court determined that, "[g]iven this
knowledge [of procedural rules], we can infer from the failure to comply with the procedural requirements that
the attorney made a decision not to exercise the right at issue." Id.
137 Id. at 664; accordid. at 672 (Martinez, J., dissenting) ("The majority applies its presumption in this case even
though there is evidence rebutting it."); id. at 673 ("In effect, the majority creates an irrebuttable presumption by
applying the presumption of knowledge of the law when the attorney said on the record that he was unaware of
the law."). Indeed, the Court made clear that a trial court need not inquire of the defense lawyer or his client. Id.
at 670 n.6 ("[T]he trial court does not need to make sure that the attorney's failure to comply with section 16-3309(5) reflects the informed and voluntary decision of the defendant.").
131 Id. at 670 n.7 ("We offer no opinion on whether the analysis would be altered
if Hinojos-Mendoza had been a
pro se defendant.").
139 Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, No. 05SC881, 2007 Colo. LEXIS 1036 (Colo. Nov. 5, 2007). Justices Martinez
and Bender would have granted the rehearing.
140 Hinojos-Mendoza v. Colorado, 557 U.S.
934 (2009).
141 Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 671 (Colo. 2007)
136
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"'constitutionally sufficient explanation for how unknowing inaction amounts to an
'intentional' waiver,"142 Justice Martinez, joined by Justice Bender, dissented.143 In the
dissent's view, People v. Mojica-Simentalconditioned the constitutionality of Section 163-309(5) on a "proper waiver," which could only be achieved by a "voluntary, knowing,
,144
and intentional [waiver] . . . by the defendant or his attorney."
That is, Justice Martinez
agreed that defense counsel may waive the confrontation right on behalf of his client, but
Instead, Justice Martinez would have
disagreed that counsel could do so by inaction.
required, before finding a "proper waiver," the type of voluntary, knowing, and intentional
action that would be required of the defendant himself.146 Justice Martinez refused the
majority's conceptualization of the statute as "a matter of timing"1 4 7 and plainly saw the
majority's reasoning for what it was: an "irrebuttable presumption" of waiver.1 4 In the
face of evidence that no such knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver had been made
by defense counsel here, Justice Martinez would have reversed Hinojos-Mendoza's
- - 149
conviction.
C.

Cropper v. People: No-Actual-Notice-and-Demand Is Constitutional

Hinojos-Mendoza has not been the Colorado Supreme Court's final word on the
constitutionality of Colorado's notice-and-demand statute. In the 2011 case of Cropper v.
People, the Court reviewed an as-applied challenge to the statute based on MelendezDiaz.15 0 Cropper argued that Section 16-3-309(5) was unconstitutional because it does not
actually require the prosecution to issue constitutionally sufficient "notice," differentiating
Colorado's statute from the simple notice-and-demand statutes that Melendez-Diaz opined
were constitutional. 151
In Cropper's case, the prosecution had included on its pre-trial witness list the
forensic technician who had authored a report stating that a shoe-print found at the crime
scene could have been from the same type of shoe the defendant was wearing when he
152
153
was apprehended.
The prosecution had also provided the report in pre-trial discovery.
At trial, the prosecution moved to introduce technician's report without his live testimony,
explaining that he was unavailable due to family emergency. 15 Finding that the defendant
142

Id. at 673.

143

Id. at 675 (Martinez, J., dissenting).

Id. at 671. The dissent rejected the majority's characterization of Mojica-Simental'spronouncements on
waiver as "dicta" and would have categorized them as a holding. Id. at 674 n.15. Justice Martinez wrote, "The
majority has overruled Mojica-Simental's analytical foundation by discarding the requirement of a voluntary,
knowing, and intentional waiver, and leaving it without the central premise upon which the holding of facial
constitutionality is dependent." Id. at 671. Crawfordrequired adherence to, not an abandoning of, MojicaSimental's holding, in Justice Martinez's view. Id. at 675 ("[P]ost-Crawford, Mojica-Simental'swaiver
requirement has become even more important because it is now the only manner in which the statute can be
applied constitutionally without cross-examination.")
144

14

Id. at 673.

Id. at 674 ("[T]hough defendants need not personally waive this right, that does not justify undermining the
Sixth Amendment's fundamental constitutional protections.").
147 Id. at 673.
146

148 Id. at 672 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (rejecting "the majority['s] replace[ment of] Mojica-Simental's
requirement of a voluntary, knowing, and intentional waiver with an automatic waiver premised upon an
irrebuttable presumption").
19

Id. at 675 (Martinez, J., dissenting).

"0 Cropperv. People, 251 P.3d 434, 435-37 (Colo. 2011).
. Id. at 437.
52
1 Id. at 435.
153

Id. at 437.

54

' Id. at 435.
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had not complied with Section 16-3-309(5), the trial court admitted the report.1 5 5 As in
Hinojos-Mendoza, the trial court did so in the face of defense counsel's protestation that
she was unaware of the statute and had not intended to waive her client's confrontation
right.156

The Colorado Supreme Court adhered to its prior holding that a waiver may
result from defense counsel's inaction,1 5 7 and that defense counsel may waive his client's
right to confrontation by not complying with the procedures set forth in Section 16-3309(5), even where defense counsel is unaware of the statute.1 5 While noting that
Melendez-Diaz had been decided in the years since Hinojos-Mendoza and was applicable
to the case at issue, the court also (rightfully) acknowledged that "[d]espite [MelendezDiaz's] discussion of Hinojos-Mendoza, the Supreme Court did not pass judgment on
section 16-3-309(5)."159 The Colorado Supreme Court took the opportunity to do so,
however, and "h[e]ld that providing the defense with a forensic lab report through
discovery is sufficient to put the defendant on notice that, absent a specific request under
section 16-3-309(5), the report can be introduced without live testimony."160 This result
was unchanged by the fact that the prosecution had represented that it would call the live
testimony of the technician.161 Also unchanged was the court's strict adherence to its
irrebuttable presumption that a defense lawyer who does not adhere to Section 16-3309(5) intends to waive her client's confrontation right.162
Likewise, Justice Martinez, and again Chief Justice Bender with him,163 remained
steadfast in his dissent from the majority's reapplication of its Hinojos-Mendoza
reasoning.164 Echoing his dissent in that case, Justice Martinez reviewed the decades of
United States Supreme Court precedent in which "the Court has steadfastly refused to
presume the waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights from inaction alone."165 Moving
to the most recent relevant United States Supreme Court precedent, Melendez-Diaz, and
its dicta that simple notice-and-demand statutes are constitutional, Justice Martinez wrote,
"Crucial to the Court's reasoning was the fact that simple notice-and-demand statutes,
unlike the variety of statutes receiving the notice-and-demand label, require the
155

Id.

Id. at 438.
Id. at 435 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 314 n.3 (2009)).
Id. at 436 (citing Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 670 (Colo. 2007)). In fact, the Court considered
this case nothing more than a re-application of Hinojos-Mendoza. Id. at 438 ("Thus, to reach our decision in this
case, we need only look to and apply the same reasoning that we employed in Hinojos-Mendoza.").
159 Id. at 437.
151

160

id

Id. at 437-38 ("Regardless of any representations that the prosecution made that the technician
would testify,
Cropper had notice of the presence of the report and had an adequate opportunity to assert Cropper's
confrontation rights and request that the technician be present for cross-examination."); see Jones v. State, 2011
Ark. App. 683, 6 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that defendant's failure to provide notice that he wanted to
examine analyst who appeared on prosecution's witness list but did not testify waived his Confrontation Clause
rights because "the Melendez-Diaz Court acknowledged that some states have notice-and-demand statutes, [like
Arkansas's], and found them consistent with constitutional requirements").
162 Cropper, 251 P.3d at 438. If anything, that presumption was strengthened,
as the Court's language evinced
little patience for the defense counsel's unawareness of the statute. See, e.g., id. at 438 nn.8-9 (suggesting that
Cropper may have a colorable claim for malpractice and observing that "section 16-3-309(5) is not a new statute.
It has been in effect since 1984").
161 Id. at 438 (Martinez, J., dissenting).
161

164

Id. at 440.

65

Id. at 439 (citingJohnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962);
Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); Barkerv.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972)). For a more detailed discussion of this precedent, see infra Section 0.

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol3/iss1/4

16

Morris and Fontana: Colorado's Undemanding Notice Requirement: Pro Se Defendants and
COLORADO'S UNDEMANDING NOTICE REQUIREMENT

2013]

127

prosecution to provide the defendant with actual notice."16 Justice Martinez reasoned
Colorado's statute does no such thing and therefore "is not a simple notice-and-demand
statute of the type approved in Melendez-Diaz."167 His dissent perspicaciously recognized
that Melendez-Diaz listed several state notice-and-demand statutes were of the "simple"
type, and Colorado's was "[n]oticeably absent."168 Justice Martinez interpreted MelendezDiaz's list as a "refus[al] to approve statutes that lack an actual notice requirement" and
thereby "cast[ing] doubt on the constitutionality of section 16-3-309(5) and other noticeand-demand statutes that fail to require the prosecution to provide actual notice to defense
counsel."169 Finding no prosecutorial action that provided actual notice of prosecution's
intent to introduce the footprint forensic report without the testimony of its author, Justice
Martinez determined that defense counsel's failure to demand that testimony pursuant to
Section 16-3-309(5) "was not a constitutionally sufficient communication of waiver." 17 0
The majority's holding to the contrary effected an unconstitutional application of Section
16-3-309(5) from which Justice Martinez dissented. In reaching this result, Justice
Martinez again maligned the majority for creating and applying a conclusive presumption
of waiver in the face of evidence rebutting it. 171
Like Hinojos-Mendoza before him, the Colorado Supreme Court's decision was
the end of the line for Cropper. That court denied him a rehearing,172 and United States
Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari.173

IV.

"[T]HE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S STEADFAST REFUSAL TO PRESUME WAIVER
[OF A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT] FROM INACTION,1 74

The Colorado and United States Supreme Court cases detailed in Sections 0 and
III supra have not, of course, occurred in a vacuum. Instead, they have occurred against
the backdrop of decades of United States Supreme Court case law explaining that inaction
is insufficient to give rise to a waiver of a fundamental right, as discussed in MojicaSimental and in Colorado Supreme Court Justice Martinez's dissents from HinojosMendoza and Cropper.17 5 This Section details that case law.
As a primary matter, an accused's right to confront the witnesses against him is a
"bedrock procedural guarantee" and a "fundamental right."176 That "fundamental right" is
166 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305 (2009)).
Justice Martinez also traced this point to Mojica-Simental, observing that "Melendez-Diaz confirms the
fundamental importance of our emphasis in Mojica-Simental on actual notice." Id. at 441 n. 11 (citing People v.
Mojica-Simental, 73 P.3d 15, 21 (Colo. 2003)).

167 Id. at 440.
161
169

Id. (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326).
id

7

1 o Id. at 441.

171 Id. at 441-42. On this point, Justice Martinez firmly rejected any hint that Melendez-Diaz approved of the
presumption of waiver created in Hinojos-Mendozaand instead read Melendez-Diaz to "impl[y] that the mere
existence of a statute is an insufficient basis to presume that an attorney made an informed decision to forego the
right to confrontation." Id. at 440-41.
172 Cropperv. People, No. 09SC828, 2011 Colo. LEXIS 358 (Apr. 25, 2011). Justice
Martinez and Chief Justice
Bender would have granted the rehearing.
171 Cropperv. Colorado, 132 S. Ct. 837 (2011).
174 Cropperv. People, 251 P.3d 434, 442 (Colo. 2011) (Martinez, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 439; Hinojos-Mendoza, 169 P.3d 662, 671 (Colo. 2007) (Martinez, J., dissenting); People v. MojicaSimental, 73 P.3d 15, 20 (Colo. 2003).
176 People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 974-75 (Colo. 2004) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004)); Id. at
975; see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-06 (1965).
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guaranteed under both the United States and Colorado Constitutions."' Like other
fundamental rights, the right to confrontation is waivable."' However, "[g]enerally, the
U.S. Supreme Court has refused to presume waiver of a fundamental constitutional right
from a defendant's inaction." 1 7 9 "The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed
constitutional right is, of course, a federal question controlled by federal law."Iso
To that end, the United States Supreme Court has defined the waiver of a
fundamental constitutional right as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege," dependent "upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case."
The Colorado Supreme Court has summarized (and
harmonized) United States and Colorado case law to require three elements of a waiver:
that it be made (1) "knowingly," (2) "intentionally and intelligently," and (3)
"voluntarily":
Thus, a valid waiver must be "knowingly" made, that is, the person
waiving the particular right must "know" of the existence of the right
and any other information legally relevant to the making of an informed
decision either to exercise or relinquish that right. Second, the waiver
must be made "intentionally" and "intelligently," that is, the person
waiving that right must be fully aware of what he is doing and must
make a conscious, informed choice to relinquish the known right. And,
third, that conscious choice must be made "voluntarily," that is, not
coerced by the state either physically or psychologically.
Given the affirmative action required to waive a fundamental constitutional right,
"courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and . . . do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights."183 This Section details that presumption, as delineated across decades of United
States Supreme Court decisions, and across the United States Constitution's protections
for the accused.
A.

The Right to Counsel

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the fundamental Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. 14 The Court has equally consistently held
that a defendant's waiver of that fundamental right must be explicit and may not be
18 5
inferred from his inaction.

177

U.S. CONST. amend. VI; COLO. CONST. at. II,

§ 16.

See Hinojos-Mendozav. People, 169 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo. 2007) (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4
(1966); Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999)).
179 Cropper, 251 P.3d at 439 (Martinez, J., dissenting); see also Metzger, supra
note 7, at 517-18 (explaining
how "application of the demand-waiver doctrine is particularly absurd" in the context of confrontation of
forensic witnesses).
' Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4; see also Boykinv. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (citing Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965)).

...
Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled in part on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451

U.S. 477 (1981).
182 People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 121 n.4 (Colo. 1986)
(emphasis added); see also Hinojos-Mendozav. People,
169 P.3d 662, 673 (Colo. 2007) (Martinez, J., dissenting).
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideonv. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (noting that "lawyers in criminal
courts are necessities, not luxuries").

..See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
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Case law generally traces the definition of a waiver, with regard to constitutional
rights, to the United States Supreme Court's 1938 decision in Johnson v. Zerbst,186 a case
involving the right to counsel. In Johnson, a criminal defendant was tried and convicted
without the assistance of counsel. 17 The Court "pointed out that 'courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and that we
'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."'" The Court defined a
waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."18 Importantly, the Court noted that in applying that definition, "The
determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must
depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,
including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." 190 The Court
remanded the case to the district court for a factual determination of whether such an
intelligent waiver had occurred. 191
In the decades since Johnson, the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied this
holding to reject state court attempts to presume waiver of the right to counsel based only
on failure of the defendant to appear with counsel.192 In Rice v. Olson,193 a 1945 case, a
criminal defendant pled guilty at his arraignment without being advised of his right to
counsel.194 He alleged that he had been denied his right to counsel and to call witnesses,
despite the fact that "he had not waived those rights by word or action."195 The Nebraska
Supreme Court below had held that "[i]t is not necessary that there be a formal waiver;
and a waiver will ordinarily be implied where accused appears without counsel and fails to
request that counsel be assigned to him, particularly where accused voluntarily pleads
guilty."196 The United States Supreme Court resolutely rejected the state court's
conclusive presumption of waiver.197 First, the Court noted that "[w]hatever inference of
waiver could be drawn from the petitioner's plea of guilty is adequately answered by the
uncontroverted statement in his petition that he did not waive the right either by word or
action."198 Instead, the Court held, the defendant's denial raised a question of fact as to
whether the defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment
rights.199 The Court remanded for a factual determination of whether the defendant had
made such a waiver.20 0
Two decades later, in 1962, the Supreme Court reiterated the impermissibility of
a waiver of the right to counsel based solely on the defendant's failure to appear with
116

304 U.S. 458 (1938).

11

Id. at 460.

Id. at 464 (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412
(1882); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
189 Id
190

Id

191

Id. at 469.

Cropperv. People, 251 P.3d 434, 439 (Colo. 2011) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972);
Boykinv. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Camley v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962); Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
193 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
194 Id. at 786-87.
192

195

Id at 787.

196

Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks omitted).

197

id

198

Id

199

Id. at 788-89.

200

Id. at 791.
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counsel.201 In Carnley v. Cochran,202 a criminal defendant was tried without the assistance
of counsel.203 Echoing its decision in Rice, the Supreme Court rejected a state-courtcreated presumption that a defendant had waived a fundamental constitutional right based
204
solely on the absence of an appearance of counsel in the record.
The Court
unequivocally held that "[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible."205
This is because "[tlo cast such a burden on the accused is wholly at war with the standard
of proof of waiver of the right to counsel . . laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst."206 Instead of
presuming waiver from silence or inaction, the Court stated, a waiver only arises if the
record shows "that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly
rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."207 "[N]o such burden can be imposed upon
an accused unless the record . . reveals his affirmative acquiescence."208
B.

The Right to Remain Silent

Like the right to assistance of counsel, the right to remain silent is a fundamental
constitutional right enjoyed by all citizens.209 This right arises from Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination.210 Because of the fundamental nature of the right, a
person subject to custodial interrogation "must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed"211 before he may be
questioned.212 Further, a "defendant may waive effectuation of these rights" only if "the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." 2 1 3 "[A] valid waiver will not be
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after [Miranda] warnings are given or
214
simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained."
The Supreme Court has explained that "[e]ven absent the accused's invocation of
the right to remain silent, the accused's statement during a custodial interrogation is
inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution can establish that the accused 'in fact
knowingly and voluntarily waived [Miranda] rights' when making the statement." 215In
determining whether a defendant has voluntarily waived the right to remain silent, the

201
202
203

Carley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
369 U.S. 506 (1962).
id

Id. at 513 ("[T]he State Supreme Court imputed to petitioner the waiver of the benefit of counsel on a ground
stated in the court's opinion as follows: 'If the record shows that defendant did not have counsel. ... , it will be
presumed that defendant waived the benefit of counsel."' (citation omitted)); Id. at 516.
205 id
204

206

Id. at 514.
Id. at 516.
20 8
Id. at 516-17.
209 Couchv. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) ("The importance of preserving inviolate the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination has often been stated by this Court and need not be elaborated. By its very
nature, the privilege is an intimate and personal one. It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and
thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation." (citations omitted)).
210 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . ."); see Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
211 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
212 id
207

id
Id. at 475.
215 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (alteration in original)
(quoting North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).
213

214
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Court has employed the waiver test articulated in Johnson v. Zerbst with respect to a
waiver of the right to counsel. 216
This right extends beyond the point of conviction and includes a defendant's
217
right to remain silent during sentencing proceedings.
In fact, statements made by a
defendant facing the death penalty to a court-appointed psychiatrist at an evaluation
requested by the prosecution during the sentencing phase of his criminal proceedings may
not later be used against the defendant unless he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his right to remain silent before making statements to the psychiatrist.2 Thus, the
Court has steadfastly enforced the rule that, "[g]overnments, state and federal, are . .
constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured,
and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth,"219
absent an adequate waiver of this "essential mainstay of our adversary system."220
C.

The Right to a Speedy Trial

As "one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution," the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial is yet another fundamental right.221 It is an important
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety
and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay
222
223
will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself."
In Barker v. Wingo, a 1972
case, the Supreme Court considered the contours of the right to a speedy trial, in the
appeal of a criminal defendant's conviction after 16 continuances obtained by the
224
prosecution.
The case gave the Court the opportunity to determine multiple potential
approaches to protect a right that is "necessarily relative" and "generically different from
any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused."225
One such approach that the Court considered was the "demand-waiver doctrine."226 "The
demand-waiver doctrine provides that a defendant waives any consideration of his right to
speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded a trial. Under this rigid
approach, a prior demand is a necessary condition to the consideration of the speedy trial
right."227 Citing, inter alia, Johnson, Carnley, Miranda, and Boykin, the Court decisively
ruled this approach unconstitutional: "Such an approach, by presuming waiver of a
fundamental right from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court's pronouncements on

Butler, 442 U.S. at 374-75.
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999). In Mitchell, the Court held that a district court may not
hold a defendant's "silence against her in determining the facts of the offense at [a] sentencing hearing." Id.
218 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468-69 (1981). The Estelle Court concluded that,
"[a] criminal defendant, who
neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be
compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing
proceeding." Id. at 468. The defendant in Estelle, who had been sentenced to death, had his death sentence
reversed because his "statements to [the psychiatrist] were not 'given freely and voluntarily without any
compelling influences' and, as such, could be used as the State did at the penalty phase only if [he] had been
apprised of his rights and had knowingly decided to waive them." Id. at 469 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478).
219 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 8 (1964).
220 Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 461.
221 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,
226 (1967).
222 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116,
120 (1966).
223 407 U.S. 514
(1972).
216

217

2 24

Id. at 515-16.
Id. at 519, 522-24.
226 Id. at 524-25.
227 Id. at 525.
225
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waiver of constitutional rights."228 The Court flatly rejected "the rule that a defendant who
fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right."229
D.

The "Several Federal Constitutional Rights ... Involved ...
0
Plea of Guilty Is Entered in a State Criminal Trial"2 3

When a

The Supreme Court has taken up the issue of waiver of the constitutional rights
effected by a criminal defendant's guilty plea and, each time, applied the principle that
those rights are not forfeited except by a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver.2 3 1
232

In the 1969 case of Boykin v. Alabama,
the Supreme Court expounded on
exactly which rights are waived when a criminal defendant enters a plea of guilty.233 It
found "several": the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the right to trial by
234
The Court then considered those rights in
jury, and the right to confront one's accusers.
the context of a criminal defendant who had pled guilty at his arraignment to all
indictments against him.235 Alabama law required sentencing by jury thereafter, and the
236
The Court determined that
jury found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to death.
Carnley's rationale, rejecting the presumption of a waiver based on a silent record, applied
with equal force "to determin[e] whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made."237 The Court
refused to "presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent
record. "23 Instead, the Court would have required "an affirmative showing" that waiver of
his constitutional rights was made intelligently and voluntarily.239 Because no such
affirmative showing existed in the record, the Court reversed the conviction.240
The Court took up the issue again in Brady v. United States,241 wherein it
described Boykin's holding as adding a requirement of an affirmative showing to the longstanding requirement that a guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent.242 The case again
considered whether a guilty plea was made voluntarily, this time in the context of a
defendant who faced a maximum sentence of death but received a sentence of 50 years
243
under the plea.
The defendant alleged that his plea was not voluntary because (1) the
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 528. In its place, the Supreme Court announced a rule "that the defendant's assertion of or failure to
assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the
right." Id. The Court made clear that the rule "places the primary burden on the courts and the prosecutors to
assure that cases are brought to trial." Id. at 529. In so doing, the Court was guided by the "unique" nature of the
right to a speedy trial, "in its uncertainty as to when and under what circumstances it must be asserted or may be
deemed waived." Id. In making its ruling, the Court "d[id] not depart from [its] holdings in other cases
concerning the waiver of fundamental rights, in which [it] ha[s] placed the entire responsibility on the
prosecution to show that the claimed waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made." Id.
230 Boykinv. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243 (1969).
228
229

231

id

232

395 U.S. 238 (1969).

233

id

234

id

Id.
Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
235

at 239.

236

at 240.
at 242.

241
242
243

at 243.

at 242.
at 244.

397 U.S. 742 (1970).
Id. at 747 n.4 (1970) (citing Boykin, 385 U.S. at 242).
Id. at 744. The sentence was later reduced to 30 years. Id.
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statute under which he was charged operated to coerce his plea because it authorized a
sentence of death, (2) his attorney improperly pressured his plea, and (3) his plea was
244
induced by representations with respect to reduction of sentence and clemency.
The
Court rejected the argument that the criminal statute was inherently coercive because it
245
authorized a sentence of death.
Instead, the Court reaffirmed that the proper test was
whether his plea was voluntary and intelligent, as evidenced by an affirmative showing in
246
the record.
The Court defined waiver as follows: "Waivers of constitutional rights not
only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
,247
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."
Applying this
definition, and reviewing the circumstances of the guilty plea, the Court affirmed that
248
Brady made the plea voluntarily and intelligently and thus constitutionally.
E.

The Right to Be Confronted with One's Accusers

As described above, an accused's right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him is a fundamental right.249 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it may
not be forfeited absent a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. It has done so in the
context of the waiver of the confrontation right subsumed in a guilty plea, as described in
Section 0(0) supra, and it has do so in cases concerning more direct waivers of the
confrontation right, as detailed in this Section.
In the 1966 case of Brookhartv. Janis,250 the Court considered the conviction of
a defendant after his counsel had agreed to a prima facie bench trial.25 The defendant
argued that his confrontation right had been violated by (1) the introduction of an out-ofcourt alleged confession of a co-defendant and (2) the denial of his right to cross-examine
252
any of the prosecution's witnesses.
The Court first observed that the defendant's
253
confrontation right could not have been denied without a valid waiver.
It went on to find
that the record showed that "that petitioner himself did not intelligently and knowingly
agree to be tried in a proceeding which was the equivalent of a guilty plea and in which he
would not have the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses against
him."254 Because the defendant had "neither personally waived his right nor acquiesced in
255
his lawyer's attempted waiver," the Court reversed the conviction.

244

id

Id. at 746-47.
246 Id. at 747, 747 n.4 (citing Boykin, 395
U.S. at 242).
245

Id. at 748 (emphasis added) (citing Brookhartv. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942); Johnsony. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Pattonv. United States, 281
U.S. 276, 312 (1930)).
248 Id. at 758. On this point, the Court pointed to an absence of "evidence that
Brady was so gripped by fear of
247

the death penalty or hope of leniency that he did not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the
advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty." Id. at 750. The Court declined to
invalidate a guilty plea "whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a
lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher
penalty authorized by law for the crime charged." Id. at 751. Instead, the Court upheld the constitutionality of his
plea even though acknowledging it "may well have been motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death
penalty." Id. at 758.
249 See supra notes 176-77.
250

384 U.S. 1 (1966).

251

Id. at 5-6.

252

Id. at 2.
253 Id. at 4.

Id. at 7. The Court found that "[h]is emphatic statement to the judge that 'in no way am I pleading guilty'
negatives any purpose on his part to agree to have his case tried on the basis of the State's proving a prima facie
254
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The Court reached a similar decision in the 1968 case of Barber v. Page.256
There, the Supreme Court considered the conviction of a defendant in which the principal
evidence against him was the reading of the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness
who, by the time of trial, was incarcerated in a different state. 257 At that preliminary
hearing, an attorney for the defendant had not cross-examined the witness, although an
attorney for a co-defendant did.258 Nevertheless, the Court determined that the defendant
had not waived his right to confrontation.259 At that hearing, the Court determined, the
defendant could not have been aware that by the time of trial, the witness would be
incarcerated out-of-state, and he could also not have been aware that the prosecution
would make no effort to produce the witness by trial.260 According to the Court, "[to
suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the
right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court's definition of a
waiver as 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."'261 Even if the defendant had cross-examined at the preliminary hearing, the
Court would have reached the same result, because "[t]he right to confrontation is
basically a trial right."262 Determining that "[t]he right of confrontation may not be
dispensed with so lightly," the Court reversed the defendant's conviction. 263
Thus, it is unequivocal that a defendant's fundamental confrontation right may
not be forfeited by anything short of his knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.

V.

NOTICE-AND-DEMAND PROVISIONS IN THEIR VARIOUS FORMS

The Colorado Supreme Court is not, of course, the only state court to consider
the constitutionality of its state's notice-and-demand provision. To contextualize
Colorado's judicial opinions on this issue, this Section reviews case law from other states
concerning notice-and-demand statutes.
A.

Unconstitutional Notice-and-Demand Provisions

Many state courts that have struck down notice-and-demand statutes have
employed a variant of the rationale that the automatic waiver of rights effected when a
defendant fails to demand testimony is not a waiver that, as the Constitution requires, is
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Others have construed their state's statute in a way to
avoid constitutionally problematic results. Still others have upheld notice-and-demand
statutes while employing reasoning that supports the proposition that statutes such as
Colorado's are unconstitutional as applied to pro se defendants. This Section details those
decisions.

case which both the trial court and the State Supreme Court held was the practical equivalent of a plea of guilty."
Id.
255 Id at 8.
256
257

Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
Id. at 720-21.

Id. at 720.
259 Id. at 725.

258

Id. Elsewhere, the Court faulted the prosecution for its lack of effort to locate the witness. Id. at 724. The
Court determined that a witness may not be deemed "unavailable" for confrontation and hearsay purposes
"unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial." Id. at 724-25.
260

26 1

262
263

Id. at725 (quoting Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Brookhartv. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966)).
Id. at 725.

Id. at 725-26.
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One early decision striking down a notice-and-demand statute was the Illinois'
Supreme Court's decision in People v. McClanahan.26 That decision held Illinois' noticeand-demand statute unconstitutional even under the pre-Crawford, arguably looser Ohio v.
265
Roberts framework.
Similar to Colorado's, the Illinois statute permitted the admission
into evidence of a laboratory report, unless the defendant demanded testimony within
seven days of receipt of the report.266 The Court found that the automatic statutorilyoperated waiver that occurs if the defendant fails to demand "does not guarantee that this
waiver is a knowing and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences. 267 The Court emphasized that an accused's "right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . is a mandatory constitutional
obligation of the prosecuting authority. It arises automatically at the inception of the
adversary process, and no action of the defendant is necessary to activate this
constitutional guarantee in his case."268 Because the statute did not guarantee that this
constitutional obligation would be met, the Court struck down the statute as violative of
the federal and state Confrontation Clauses.2 6 9
Other states have joined Illinois. In State v. Caulfield, the Minnesota Supreme
Court deemed Minnesota's notice-and-demand statute unconstitutional.271 Minnesota's
statute was also strikingly similar to Colorado's in that it "permit[ted] the admission of 'a
report of the facts and results of any laboratory analysis or examination if it is prepared
and attested by the person performing the analysis or examination in any laboratory
operated by the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension,"' but allowed the defendant to demand
272
the live testimony of the analyst at least ten days before trial. The Court struck down the
statute because it did not provide adequate notice to the defendant of the consequences of
his failure to demand the testimony:
At a minimum, any statute purporting to admit testimonial reports
without the testimony of the preparer must provide adequate notice to
the defendant of the contents of the report and the likely consequences
of his failure to request the testimony of the preparer. Otherwise, there is
no reasonable basis to conclude that the defendant's failure to request the
testimony constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his
confrontation rights.27 3

People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 2000).
Id. at 474-75, 478.
266 Id. at 473 (citing 725 ILCS 5/115-15); see COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-3-309 (2012).
267 McClanahan,729 U.S.
at 477.
264
265

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 478. In a subsequent case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that defense counsel may waive a defendant's
confrontation right by stipulating to the admission of evidence as long as the defendant does not object and the
decision to waive is a matter of legitimate trial tactics and strategy. People v. Campbell, 802 N.E.2d 1205, 1213,
1215 (Ill. 2003). Importantly, "[w]here the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to
convict the defendant or where the State's entire case is to be presented by stipulation, we find that a defendant
must be personally admonished about the stipulation and must personally agree to the stipulation." Id. at 1215.
The Court thus acknowledged that, even though waiver of confrontation by counsel is permissible in some
circumstances, there remain circumstances where a defendant must personally participate in and making a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his confrontation right.
270 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn.
2006).
268

269

271

id

Id. at 310 (citing Minn. Stat. § 634.15, subd. 1(a), 2(a)(2004); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309 (2012).
Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 313. The dissent in Caulfieldattempted to find that Minnesota's notice-and-demand
statute constitutional by reference to what it deemed "nonexplicit waivers of confrontation rights" authorized by
Supreme Court case law. Id. at 318 n.2 (Johnson, J., dissenting). This reasoning, however, is unpersuasive. First,
272
273
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An especially relevant interpretation of a notice-and-demand statute came in the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision in Thomas v. United States.27 The
District of Columbia's notice-and-demand statute "direct[ed] that a chemist's report is
admissible in evidence in the chemist's absence (even if the chemist is available, and even
if the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the chemist), unless the
defendant subpoenas the chemist to appear."275 The court found that direction to be
problematic after Crawford and chose to construe the statute to preserve its
276
constitutionality.
The Court reinterpreted the statute as follows:
As we now construe § 48-905.06, it still authorizes the government to
introduce a chemist's report without calling the chemist in its case-inchief, but only so long as the record shows a valid waiver by the
defendant of his confrontation right. Absent a valid waiver, which
usually must be express but under some circumstances may be inferable
from a defendant's failure to request the government to produce the
author of the report, the defendant enjoys a Sixth Amendment right to
be confronted with the chemist in person. 2 7 7
As to a "valid waiver," the court considered and conformed to the United States Supreme
Court formulations of that concept.278 The court described "the best course for the
government obviously" to be to obtain an express waiver from the defendant, perhaps via
a stipulation or pretrial hearing.279 The court suggested one-and only one-circumstance
in which a court might permissibly "infer a valid waiver of the right of confrontation, in
the absence of an express waiver."280 That circumstance was as follows:
[I]f a defendant represented by counsel is provided with the chemist's
report and is advised that a failure to request the chemist's presence for
purposes of confrontation will be understood as a waiver of the right and
as a stipulation to the admissibility of the chemist's report, we think that
a trial court would be justified in inferring a valid waiver from an
unexplained or unexcused failure by the defendant to respond.2 8 1
That circumstance leaves open two possibilities where a waiver may not be inferred: (1)
where defense counsel explains or excuses failure to respond, and (2) where a defendant is
not represented by counsel. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision thus
acknowledges that pro se defendants must be analyzed differently than represented
defendants with respect to waiver of their confrontation rights.2 82

the dissent itself acknowledged that the cases it cited were distinguishable from the facts at hand, in that those
cases all involved instances of defendant misconduct. Id. Second, misconduct, of course, is not inaction but
affirmative conduct.
274 914 A.2d 1 (D.C.
2006).
275

Id

at 18.

Id. at 5, 18-20.
Id. at 5 (emphases added).
278 Id. at 19 (citing Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968);
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972)).
279 id
276
277

id
Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 528-29).
282 id
280

281
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The Ohio Supreme Court's pronouncements on Ohio's notice-and-demand
statute echo this sentiment. In State v. Pasqualone,
that court affirmed the
constitutionality of Ohio's notice-and-demand statute, but did so in a way that left two
2814
First, the court observed that the notice provided to
openings relevant to this Article.
Pasqualone included notice of the consequences of his failure to demand the analyst's
testimony and also otherwise complied in full with the statute, and thus a valid waiver had
2815
occurred in the circumstances presented.
In making this observation, the court
specifically distinguished the case at hand from a prior Ohio Court of Appeals decision
wherein the notice provided had not stated the consequences of failure to demand
2816
testimony pursuant to the statute. The court carefully confined its decision to the facts at
hand; 287at least one Ohio lower appellate case has seized on this distinction to determine
that where the prosecution's notice does not state the consequences of failure to demand
testimony, no valid waiver can be found.2 The second crucial point in the court's logic,
providing a ground on which the case may be distinguished, is that the court emphasized
that the defendant was represented by counsel and that a defendant's counsel may waive
his client's confrontation rights without approval.28 The court cited to Hinojos-Mendoza
on this point,290 and again confined its holding to the facts before it, i.e., where the
defendant is represented by counsel.291 The Pasqualoneopinion therefore does not govern
the case of a pro se defendant.
In addition, other state high courts have deemed unconstitutional their state's
statutory mechanism for procuring analyst testimony based on the rationale, eventually
elucidated in Melendez-Diaz, that a state may not shift the burden of calling witnesses
292
against the defendant to the defense.
At least one other, the Kansas Supreme Court, has

283

903 N.E.2d 270 (Ohio 2009).

284

id

285

Id. at 275.

Id. (citing State v. Smith, No. 1-05-39, 2006 WL 846342, at*7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)).
Id ("We determine that a valid waiver occurs in the situation presented by the case sub judice.").
288 See State v. McClain, No. L-10-1088, 2012 WL 5508133, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 9, 2012) (citing Taconv.
Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 355 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)) (citing Pasqualone"to implicitly approve the
proposition first stated [in State v. Smith] that, in order to comply with the Sixth Amendment and R.C. 2925.51
[the notice-and-demand statute], the notice provision in a lab report must convey to the defendant the
consequences of failure to demand the laboratory analyst's testimony).
289 Pasqualone, 903 N.E.2d
at 275-77.
290 Id. at 276 (citing Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d
662 (Colo. 2007)).
291 Id. at 280 ("We hold that an accused's attorney is capable of waiving his client's
right to confrontation by not
demanding that a laboratory analyst testify pursuant to the opportunity afforded by [the notice-and-demand
286
287

statute].").

See State v. Birchfield, 157 P.3d 216, 219-220 (Or. 2007) (striking down, as unconstitutional under the State
Constitution's Confrontation Clause, a statutory requirement that the defendant notify the state if he insisted on
the right to cross-examine a laboratory analyst); Cypress v. Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 206, 213 (Va. 2010)
(determining, in light ofMelendez-Diaz, that Virginia statute that shifted the burden of calling witnesses against
the defendant to the defense "did not adequately protect [the defendants'] Confrontation Clause rights" and
failure to comply with the statute did not operate as a waiver of those rights); Mnookin, supra note 7, at 799
n.19 (arguing that notice-and-demand statutes requiring that defendant's demand contain some kind of good-faith
showing are "constitutionally problematic"); cf State v. Belvin, 986 So. 2d 516, 525 (Fla. 2008) (citing FLA.
STAT. § 316.1934 (2012)) (determining that statute that permits admission of breath test operator's affidavit but
also allows defendant to subpoena the operator as an adverse witness "does not adequately preserve the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation"); State v. Miller, 790 A.2d 144, 156 (N.J. 2002)
(construing notice-and-demand statute to require only that defendant object to admission of lab certificate and
assert it will be contested, rejecting an interpretation requiring a more detailed objection as it would have placed
too great a burden on defendant). The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield struck down Oregon's
statute on this ground, but suggested that a notice-and-demand requirement would indeed be constitutional.
292
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found constitutional infirmity in its notice-and-demand statute on the ground that it
extends too far beyond Melendez-Diaz's description of such statutes in their "simplest
form."

29 3

B.

"[Tlreat[ing] the Question of Waiver Cavalierly" 2 9 4 : Decisions
Affirming the Constitutionality of Notice-and-Demand Statutes

By contrast, other state courts have upheld their state's notice-and-demand
statutes. Of those, some have done so with fleeting reference to Melendez-Diaz's footnote
authorizing notice-and-demand statutes "[i]n their simplest form." 29 5 Lower appellate
296
courts in Arkansas, Iowa, North Carolina, Texas, and Washington are among this group.
Similarly, some state courts have upheld their state's notice-and-demand statute with no
consideration whatsoever of Supreme Court case law governing an accused's waiver of
297
his or her constitutional rights.
One early example of this type of decision was the
Nevada Supreme Court's 2005 decision in City of Las Vegas v. Walsh.298 There, the court
determined that a forensic affidavit was a testimonial statement.299 It further determined
that, because the statute permitted the defense to object "in writing" to the admission of
the affidavit absent testimony of its author, it "adequately preserve[d] the constitutional
right to confront witnesses against a defendant by providing a statutory confrontation
mechanism." 3 0 0 The statute was therefore constitutional and failure to use the statutory
mechanism would result in a waiver.301 The Nevada Supreme Court reached this

Birchfield, 157 P.3d at 219-220; cf State v. Willis, 236 P.3d 714, 717 n.1 (Ore. 2010) (observing that Birchfield
accords with the Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz).
293 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 326 (2009); see State v. Laturner,
218 P.3d 23, 38-40 (Kan.
2009) (severing portion of Kansas' notice-and-demand statute, in order to transform it into a constitutional,
simple notice-and-demand statute under Melendez-Diaz). The lower appellate court in Laturner had considered,
and struck down the statute based on the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements on waiver of
fundamental rights. Id. at 31-32. The Kansas Supreme Court, however, read Melendez-Diaz to cast some doubt
on that rationale, and instead severed Kansas' statute such that the remaining portions mirrored the "simplest"
notice-and-demand statute deemed constitutional by Melendez-Diaz. Id. at 39. Prior to this decision severing the
statute, the Kansas statute "require[d] not just that a defendant demand that the laboratory analyst testify at trial
but that the defendant state an objection and the grounds for the objection." Id. at 30.
294 Taconv. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 354 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
295

Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326.

See Jones v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 683, at 6-7 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that defendant's failure to
provide notice that he wanted to examine analyst who appeared on prosecution's witness list but did not testify
did not violate Confrontation Clause because "the Melendez-Diaz Court acknowledged that some states have
notice-and-demand statutes [like Arkansas's], and found them consistent with constitutional requirements");
Watsonv. State, No. 2-1057/11-1833, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 40, at *14-16 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2013) (noting
that the Melendez-Diaz Court approved of "such statutes" as Iowa's ten-day notice-and-demand requirement);
State v. Steele, 689 S.E.2d 155, 160-61 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); Carsonv. State, No. 11-10-00178-CR, 2012 Tex.
App. LEXIS 4721, at *5-7 (Tex. App. June 14, 2012) (per curiam) (determining that Melendez-Diaz authorized
notice-and-demand statutes and cursorily deciding that, because defendant did not demand testimony of
laboratory report author pursuant to the statute, defendant had waived his Confrontation rights); Herring v. State,
No. 05-08-01699-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 3136, at *2-5 (Tex. App. Apr. 28, 2010) (same); State v.
Schroeder, 262 P.3d 1237, 1239 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) ("This rule comports with Melendez-Diaz.").
297 See, e.g., Culbersonv. State, No. 11-06-00196-CR, 2008
Tex. App. LEXIS 2720, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 17,
2008) (agreeing with Deener that Texas notice-and-demand statute is not facially unconstitutional); Deener v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 522, 527-28 (Tex. App. 2006) (determining that criminal defendant suffered no Confrontation
violation where his right to confront the witnesses against him was waived by his failure to object under two
Texas notice-and-demand statutes).
298 City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203, 208-09
(Nev. 2005).
296

299

Id. at 207-08.

300

Id. at 208.

301

Id. at 209.
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conclusion with minimal analysis, never considering an as-applied challenge or opining on
whether and how the statute might be applied unconstitutionally.
Another example of this minimal analysis came in the North Dakota Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Campbell.302 There, the court cited Walsh to determine that the
defendants waived their confrontation rights by failing to follow the notice-and-demand
statute, but the court never once considered the constitutionality of statute itself.3 0 3
Louisiana is another of this group, as it has now twice affirmed its notice-and-demand
statute without considering the constitutional validity of the waiver effected by it.3 04
The minimalistic analysis contained in these decisions simply fails to persuade.
The United States Supreme Court has "never treated the question of waiver cavalierly,"30 5
and state-court decisions that do cannot offer persuasive force on the question of waiver of
a federal constitutional right.

VI.

"THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION MAY NOT BE DISPENSED WITH SO
LIGHTLY,, 30 6: THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF COLORADO'S NOTICE-ANDDEMAND STATUTE AS APPLIED TO PRO SE DEFENDANTS

Against the backdrop outlined in Sections 0-0 supra, this Section picks up where
footnote seven in Hinojos-Mendoza left off and addresses how that opinion's analysis is
altered for pro se defendants.3 0 7
It has long been clear that a criminal defendant has the right to forego his
constitutionally guaranteed right to assistance of counsel in order to exercise his right to
represent himself.308 As a result, numerous questions arise regarding whether pro se
defendants and defendants represented by counsel must (or should) be treated the same
way. Dissenting in Farettav. California,Justice Blackmun explicitly listed some of these
questions:
Must every defendant be advised of his right to proceed pro se? If so,
when must that notice be given? Since the right to assistance of counsel
and the right to self-representation are mutually exclusive, how is the
waiver of each right to be measured? If a defendant has elected to
exercise his right to proceed pro se, does he still have a constitutional
right to assistance of standby counsel? How soon in the criminal
proceeding must a defendant decide between proceeding by counsel
or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial? May a violation of
the right to self-representation ever be harmless error? Must the trial
court treat the pro se defendant differently than it would professional
counsel? I assume that many of these questions will be answered with
finality in due course. Many of them, however, such as the standards of

302

719 N.W.2d 374, 378 (N.D. 2006).

Id. at 377-78 (citing Walsh, 124 P.3d at 209).
See State v. Simmons, 78 So. 3d 743, 745-48 (La. 2012); State v. Cunningham, 903 So. 2d 1110, 1121 (La.
2005).
303

304

305
306
307

Taconv. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 354 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 670 n.7 (Colo. 2007).

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) ("[T]he question is whether a State may constitutionally hale a
person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct
his own defense. It is not an easy question, but we have concluded that a State may not constitutionally do so.").
30'
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waiver and the treatment of the pro se defendant, will haunt the trial of
309
every defendant who elects to exercise his right to self-representation.
Unique concerns undoubtedly arise within the context of a defendant
representing himself at trial.310 To that end, at least some judges issuing decisions about
the constitutionality of notice-and-demand statutes have recognized a difference between a
defendant represented by counsel and a defendant representing himself. For instance,
311
Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Johnson's dissent in State v. Cunningham
differentiated pro se and indigent defendants from those represented by counsel and
expressed concern regarding the effect of Louisiana's defense subpoena statute on such
defendants.3 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did so even more persuasively
when, in Thomas v. United States,313 it suggested at least one circumstance-that of the
pro se defendant-in which a waiver may not be inferable from a defendant's failure to
demand forensic technician testimony .314
Those judges take the better view. As a primary matter, where a defendant has no
defense counsel, he is not operating under the principle that his lawyer may waive his
315
rights by inaction or without approval.
Similarly, Hinojos-Mendoza's "presum[ption]
that attorneys know the applicable rules of procedure"316 is obviously inoperative in the
case of a pro se defendant. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the legal
knowledge of a defense attorney may not be presumed on behalf of a pro se defendant. In
317
Carnley v. Cochran, the Court pointed out that:
While [the pro se defendant] was advised that he need not testify, he was not told
what consequences might follow if he did testify. He chose to testify and his
criminal record was brought out on his cross-examination. For defense lawyers, it
is commonplace to weigh the risk to the accused of the revelation on crossexamination of a prior criminal record, when advising an accused whether to take
the stand in his own behalf; for petitioner, the question had to be decided in
ignorance of this important consideration.318
Lower court judges have recognized this distinction as well. For example, Ninth Circuit
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, in a dissenting opinion, wrote:
Finally, unlike Green, who was represented by counsel, Ohman had no
lawyer present. The lack of representation is critical here. The message
conveyed when a sentencing judge personally addresses a defendant
who has a lawyer by his side, and inquires whether the defendant
himself wishes to speak to the court regarding his sentence is
309

Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphases added).

30

See Sharon Finegan, Pro Se Criminal Trials and the Merging ofInquisitorialandAdversarialSystems of

Justice, 58 CATH. U. L. REv. 445, 471-72 (2009) ("Trials in which a defendant represents himself present a host
of problems that undermine the fairness of the proceedings. Determinations of competency, conflicts with
standby counsel, utilization of proper procedure, and overall fairness of the proceedings are called into question
when a defendant proceeds pro se." (footnotes omitted)).
..903 So. 2d 1110 (La. 2005).
312 Id. at 1127 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting).
31
314

914 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2006)
Id. at 19.

Cf Hinojos-Mendozav. People, 169 P. 3d 662, 670 (Colo. 2007); Thomas, 914 A.2d at 19; People v.
Campbell, 802 N.E.2d 1205, 1213, 1215 (Ill. 2003); State v. Pasqualone, 903 N.E.2d 270 (Ohio 2009).
316 Hinojos-Mendoza, 169 P.3d at 670 (citing Christie v.
People, 837 P.2d 1237, 1244 (Colo. 1992)).
31.

317

369 U.S. 506 (1962).

...
Id. at 511.
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fundamentally different from the message conveyed when a judge
inquires jointly of a pro se defendant/advocate and the prosecutor
whether they wish to make 'any comments . . . before [she] announce[s]
the sentence [she is] inclined to impose.' In the former case, the question
is much more likely to be interpreted by the defendant as an opportunity
to speak freely about why he deserves leniency. (He also has the benefit
of his lawyer's counsel as to what he may and may not say in response
to the invitation to speak.) In the latter case, the defendant may well not
understand, as Ohman clearly did not, that he should speak in his role as
319
defendant rather than in his capacity as an advocate.
These differences provide a backdrop for the conclusion that, in the absence of
defense counsel, a defendant is returned to that baseline principle that waiver of any of his
constitutional rights must be done only by himself and only knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily.320 That is, in the case of a pro se defendant, a different presumption operates:
that by which "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and . . . do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." 3 2 1
With this different presumption in mind, it is especially important to review how
Colorado's notice-and-demand statute operates. Cropper provides that merely "providing
the defense with a forensic lab report through discovery is sufficient to put the defendant
on notice that, absent a specific request under section 16-3-309(5), the report can be
,,322
introduced without live testimony.
This action, as Justice Martinez's dissent in
Cropper accurately observes, does not serve as "notice" that the prosecution intends to
323
offer the report pursuant to Section 16-3-309(5).
This action is a separate duty under
Colo. R. Crim. Pro. 16, which governs the prosecution's disclosure obligations; disclosure
in discovery pursuant to this rule provides no indication of whether the prosecution will
324
introduce the report at trial.
This review reveals two infirmities in the application of the statute to pro se
defendants: that (1) the statute is not within the "simplest" category of such statutes passed
on in dicta in Melendez-Diaz, and (2) the "notice" provided by the statute does not trigger
a knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver on the part of a pro se defendant. As to the first
point, the precise category of "simple" notice-and-demand statutes on which MelendezDiaz remarked was as follows: statutes that "require the prosecution to provide notice to
the defendant of its intent to use an analyst's report as evidence at trial."325 Providing the
report in discovery provides notice only of the report's existence, not of the prosecution's
intent to use it at trial. In the case of a pro se defendant, mere provision in discovery
cannot be equated with notice of intent to use the report at trial. To complete that equation,
United States v. Ohman, 13 F. App'x 568, 572-73 (9th Cir. 2001) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (alterations and
omission in original).
320 This is reinforced by the fact that federal law controls the waiver of a federally
guaranteed constitutional right.
319

See supra note 180.
321 Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled in part on other grounds
by Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting, respectively, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S.
389, 393 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301
U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
322 Cropperv. People, 251 P.3d 434, 437 (Colo.
2011).
323 Id. at 441 & n.12 (Martinez, J.,
dissenting).
324

id

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 326 (2009) (emphasis added); see also Cropper, 251 P.3d at
439-40 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (citingMelendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541).
325

Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2013

31

University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
142

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

Cropper resorted to its presumption that defense counsel has knowledge of all procedural
rules.326 In the case of a pro se defendant, there is no presumption available to make the
leap from discovery to intent to use at trial. Thus, at least as applied to a pro se defendant,
,327
Colorado's is not a notice-and-demand statute in "simplest form."
The constitutionality
of Colorado's statute is therefore not within Melendez-Diaz's dicta.
As to the second point, as described in Cropper, Colorado's notice-and-demand
statute is triggered upon the provision in discovery of a forensic lab report.328 Absent a
demand pursuant to the statute, a defendant's right to confront the report's author is
waived.329 A pro se defendant provided a laboratory report via discovery is situated more
akin to the defendants in Johnson, Rice, and Carnley than he is to his represented
counterpart in Mojica-Simental, Hinojos-Mendoza, and Cropper. As to the pro se
defendant, "[t]he determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right
to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused." 3 3 0 The automatic waiver of Colorado Rev. Stat. § 16-3-309(5) cannot govern the
pro se defendant, because to do so would "not waive th[ose] right[s] either by word or
action,"331 but would impermissibly "[p]resum[e] waiver from a silent record."332 As in
Carnley v. Cochran, "[tlo cast such a burden on the accused is wholly at war with the
standard of proof of waiver of the right to counsel . . . laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst."333
This is so because the automatic waiver of § 16-3-309(5) neither "reveals [the
defendant's] affirmative acquiescence,"3 3 4 nor contains the affirmative showing of waiver
of a fundamental constitutional right required after Boykin v. Alabama.3 3 5 Perhaps most
importantly for the analysis, provision of a laboratory report via discovery utterly fails to
make a pro se defendant "sufficient[ly] aware[] of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." 336 Namely, the consequence that failure to demand the live testimony of
the forensic technician upon receipt of his report via discovery waives the right to confront
that technician. As applied to pro se defendants, Colorado's statute provides "no
reasonable basis to conclude that the defendant's failure to request the testimony
constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his confrontation rights." 337
Just as in Barker v. Wingo, 33 the doctrine of demand-waiver must be rejected as applied
See Cropper, 251 P.3d at 436-48.
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326.
328 Cropper, 251 P.3d
at 437.
329 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5) (2012).
326
327

..
0 Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled in part on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981).
. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945).
332 Carley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,
516 (1962).
...
Id. at 514.
334

Id. at 516-17.

See Boykinv. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 n.4 (1970)
(citing Boykin, 385 U.S. at 242)
336 Brady, 397 U.S. at 742, 748 (1970) (emphasis added) (citing Brookhart
v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942); Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Pattonv.
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930)); accordPeople v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 477 (Ill. 2000); State
v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 313 (Minn. 2006); State v. Pasqualone, 903 N.E.2d 270, 275 (Ohio 2009) (citing
State v. Smith, No. 1-05-39, 2006 WL 846342 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)); State v. McClain, No. L-10-1088, 2012
WL 5508133, at ¶ 26 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2012) (citing Taconv. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 355 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
11 State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 313 (Minn. 2006).
33.

407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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to pro se defendants under Section IV, supra.3 3 9 "Such an approach, by presuming waiver
of a fundamental right from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court's pronouncements on
waiver of constitutional rights." 3 40

VII.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court has never taken lightly the requirement that
any waiver of a fundamental constitutional right must be done "voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently."341 This is particularly true for pro se defendants, who are often
"ignoran[t] of th[e] important consideration[s]"342 underlying a waiver of such rights.
Allowing a pro se defendant to waive his confrontation rights, including those against
forensic technicians, by mere inaction is inconsistent with the longstanding principle that
the right to confront one's accusers is a "bedrock procedural guarantee."343 Colorado's
Notice-and-Demand statute, which presumes a waiver by a defendant's inaction, 3 4 4 is
therefore unconstitutional as applied to pro se defendants.

See Metzger, supra note 7, at 517-18 (arguing for the rejection of the demand-waiver doctrine in the context
of confrontation of forensic witnesses).
340 Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972) (footnote omitted); see also Rice v. Olson,
324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945)
3

(rejecting state-court-created presumption of waiver of Sixth Amendment right); Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506, 513 (1962) (same).
341 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966).
342

Carnley, 369 U.S. 506, 511 (1962).

343

Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).

344 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5) (2012).
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